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BENCH AND BAR
Have We Won In Europe?*
By GIDEON SEYMOUR**

Mr. Otis and members of the Minnesota Bar: What I am going to say
this afternoon is designed more to raise questions in your minds and to
stimulate your own thinking than to answer any questions. As your President has said, it was my privilege to be in Germany and the adjacent
countries during the last two weeks of the war in Europe. We saw Nazism
in its death throes, and yet none of us who were in the group had any sense
of being present at the final act of a drama. Rather we felt that we were
seeing a curtain rise on a new period in world affairs, which, ever since then,
I have been trying desperately to see into and to understand and to help to
interpret. The more we study what is going on, the more we are bound, I
think, to conclude that we are being too timid in our interpretation of events
-that history is moving in these days much more rapidly than our understanding of it. My fear is that it is going to take the American people two
to five years or longer to understand things that are happening now which
ought immediately to be taken into consideration in our formulation of
domestic and foreign policies.
I am going to advance three main propositions this afternoon and try
to prove them. The first is that the eastern boundary of Europe has been
moved 1,800 miles west by the events of the last few years, and that Europe
is now and will be increasingly, economically and politically, a peninsula
of the continent of Asia, just as it has always been geographically a peninsula
of Asia.
The second proposition is that Russia, like the United States, is turning to the Pacific, turning its back on Europe. For Russia that is turning
*
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to the east; for us it is a turning to the west. It means that the coming arena
of history is going to be the Pacific and China and India, just as the arena
of history for the past 500 years has been the Atlantic Ocean and the seaboards of Europe and the Americas.
And my third premise is that peace and stability and prosperity in the
United States and in the world, in our time and in our children's time, depend upon the attainment of a durable and healthy understanding between
the United States and Russia, and that if any such understanding is to be
achieved inside of a framework in which Americans can continue to keep
for ourselves the kind of life we want and continue to hold our ideals and
to work towards our objectives, the burden of achieving that understanding
falls chiefly upon the United States, because Russia can afford better than
we can to wait and let the events of history play into her hands.
I want to go back and take those up one by one in some detail. The
original plan of the major powers of the United Nations was that when
Germany was defeated and Nazism had collapsed, a central military control
commission would assume authority in. Berlin and lay down over-all policies
for the policing of Germany. Britain was to police the Ruhr, the United
States was to police Southwestern Germany, France was to police some
token territory along her own border, and Russia was to police the rest of
Germany. I think probably that is a pretty fair division of Germany for
police purposes. The control commission was to lay down over-all policies
and the police forces of the four countries were simply to put those policies
into effect. Actually it isn't working out that way, and there are fewer and
fewer signs that it is going to work out that way.
The armies of Russia, at the time we landed in Europe the last week
in April, were just coming up to the Elbe River, where the Allied armies
had stopped. Russia immediately built along the Elbe a stone wall of
secrecy and inviolability, behind which she has operated ever since, completely in the dark as far as we are concerned. Our military men-and I
believe there have been only four, including General Eisenhower and perhaps
a few staff members, who have been permitted to look beyond that line
and into Berlin-flew in and were escorted by the Russians to the place
where their business was to be done and were escorted back and flown out,
and had no liberty whatever to see what the Russians were doing in that
portion of Germany which they occupied. American correspondents have
been permitted in the Russian-held section of Germany only after they
were accredited through Moscow, and then only under the same very limited
opportunity to see what was going on. The Russian zone of policing actually
is going to extend, as we now know, a good way west of the Elbe. It is
going to come roughly to within a point about 150 miles east of the Rhine.
What Russia is doing is erecting a series of buffers in Europe. She has
built one political line of defense through Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, the
Balkans and Finland, where she intends to have wholly friendly governments.
She is building a second line of defense in the parts of Germany and
Austria which she possesses and will police.
The topic on the lips of every military and newspaper man, all the two
weeks that I was in Germany, was what Russia was going to do. There
is no reason, I think, to believe that there will be any opportunity for Allied
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military men or for news correspondents from western Europe and the
United States to move freely in the part of Germany which Russia is going
to police. I think there is no reason to believe that there is going to be free
commercial intercourse or free access by our business interests to that
part of Germany. At the time I was there, and for some time before, the
Allied military government people were talking about what to do with
Germany after the war. They were saying "We must set up in Germany,
after the collapse of Nazism, local governments. We must allow those
local governments to delegate powers to provincial governments where that
is necessary, but the provincial governments must delegate no power to a
central government in Germany, because the way to keep Germany powerless
is to keep the country decentralized and defederalized." That kind of talk
is completely unrealistic in that it presumes there is going to be an over-all
policy in Germany. Germany is, to all intents and purposes, partitioned for
at least some years to come, and it begins to be perfectly obvious that within the very considerable section of Germany which the Russians are going
to police, they are going to employ their own policies and they aren't going
to be governed by the suggestions of any central military control commission in Berlin. That central commission is to be no more than a figurehead,
at least as far as the Russian-policed section of Germany is concerned.
Now we here in the United States are still debating what to do with
Germany and what is the extent of the German people's guilt. The fact is
that there isn't any Germany left. The collapse of Nazism smashed the
fabric even of community institutions in Germany, as well as of national
institutions. This is what I mean: When Hitler came into power he immediately set out to disband church organizations and groups corresponding
to civic luncheon clubs and the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts-he did
away with all such groups and put their members into Nazi party and
German national organizations. Everything, every kind of community life
in Germany, every kind of group life, was Nazified. Now that Nazism has
been crushed and those institutions have been destroyed, the Germans just
haven't any fabric or group life left, nationally'or even in the community.
Politically, too, the Germans are completely at a loss. Every German-and
we talked to hundreds of them in the Ruhr and Thuringia and all along
the Rhine Valley and in Bavaria-every German who came up to talk to
us or whom we stopped to talk to on the street would volunteer immediately
the statement, "I am not a Nazi" or "I wasn't a Nazi." I talked to several
hundred of them, and frequently said, "All right, if you aren't a Nazi, then
what are you? Are you a Social Democrat, or a Centrist, or a Communist?"
They shrugged their shoulders and didn't know. Everybody in Germany
had been either a Nazi or an anti-Nazi for a dozen years or more. Those
who were anti-Nazis escaped from the country, if they were able to, or were
thrown into concentration camps or were done away with, or they went
along with the party and pretended to be Nazis. And when Nazism had
fallen they had nothing to tie to politically.
The German family structure also was effectively smashed by Hitler.
Children were turned informers against their parents. It is difficult for
us, who take the family so much for granted as the core of our social organization, to understand the extent to which families were broken up and
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disrupted by Nazism. General Immel of Wisconsin, whom some of you may
know, who was on General Devers' staff, told a story that could be repeated
scores of times with minor variations. In the Rhine Valley, after the
Germans had been beaten and the Allies were in complete control, our troops
found three boys, two of them nine and one ten years old, cutting telephone
cables, whittling the rubber away from the wires, twisting them together
to short the circuits, then taping them with bicycle tape so nobody could
find the break. They were playing hob with American signal corps telephone lines along the Rhine. The boys were asked why they were doing
that. They said they were doing it for the Fuehrer and a man had showed
them how to do it and had given them the knives and equipment with which
they worked. The officer who arrested them said, "What would your father
think?" They said, "Well, he probably wouldn't like it." "Suppose your
father and the Fuehrer disagreed about what you ought to do, whom would
you obey?" And they said, "Why, the Fuehrer, of course." Parental
authority was broken down. Parents were afraid of their children, because
the children were told their first duty was to serve the state even when
it was against the interests of their parents and their own family group.
Germany is in that kind of hopeless chaos today, and that is one major
reason why there isn't any Germany.
And then, of course, there is the over-all reason that the country has
been effectively cut into four pieces. Germany is not likely to become a
single nation again, under any form of government, for many, many years
to come. The line of division in Germany between the area that the Russians are to police and the area that the other Allies are to police, has
become effectively the borderline between Europe and Russia, and the
boundary between Asia (Russia) and Europe is no longer the Ural
Mountains but that line just east of the Rhine. If you will take a map of
Europe and draw a line roughly from Trieste to Stettin you will see how
much of Europe has passed definitely into the Russian zone of influence.
I think there was no practical alternative to doing what has been done
in Europe, because there isn't anything else in Europe to tie to. France is
not conceivably a first rate or even a second rate world power any more
and won't be again in our time. Political fragmentation in France is much
worse than it was even in 1939, before the beginning of the war. The French
people are extremely war weary. Every correspondent I talked to in Paris
who had lived in France before the war and worked there and knew the
French people, was unanimously agreed that there will be revolt and civil
war in France. Some of the correspondents put the date as early as Bastille
Day, July 14, for the beginning of civil disorders.
Britain is left very much weaker by this war than we in the United
States realize. We have been thinking for 165 years in this country about
imperial Britain, and conceding to her in these later years a might which
she no longer possesses. Britain, the United Kingdom--48,000,000 people
in an area about the size of the state of Minnesota-became a powerful
nation and was able to organize and maintain the peace of the world in the
century between 1815 and 1914 because she was the industrial center of the
world and very largely dominated the extension of industry in the world.
Because of that domination she had become the financial center of the
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world. She controlled the seas in a*n age when a powerful navy was the
key to peace and ocean shipping was the key to commerce. Britain has
ceased to be in that position in the world. I remarked in London on the
way home to an English friend of mine that Britain 50 years from now
would be in about the position that the Netherlands are today, and he
replied, "Yes, G. K. Chesterton said that back in 1929 in an essay" (published in a book called "Generally Speaking"). I got the book subsequently
and Chesterton says precisely that. He says the Netherlands are remembered
for their painters and Britain, 50 years from now, will be remembered
for her poets. We still think of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South
Africa-and some of us may still think of Ireland-as dominions of the
British Empire. We fail to realize that they are independent countries, and
while tied to the United Kingdom by sentimental ties even stronger than
those which tie us to that nation as a mother country, their interests more
and more lie with the nations in the world which have the power. In most
cases their interests now lie chiefly with the United States. Australia and
New Zealand, for example, recognize that their security in the Pacific
depends not on Britain, and never will again, but upon the United States.
South Africa's economic system is based on the willingness of the United
States to pay $35 an ounce for gold. Canada is so closely linked to us economically and geographically that in any division of opinion on a major
issue between the United States and Great Britain, Canada would, without
thinking twice, have to go along with the United States. In my judgment
Britain faces a problem of rehabilitation and reconstruction not exceeded
in its seriousness by that of any nation which has been in this war, including
Germany itself.
I am not one of those who believes that Europe is necessarily going
communistic in the Russian sense. I was in Paris during the municipal
elections there. The night before the election a Frenchman whom I had
looked up and wanted to talk to, because he had been a prisoner in the
concentration camp at Buchenwald, took me to a comunistic political rally.
I talked to four or five of his comrades who were communists, and they
were all condemning Stalin as an intractable old reactionary who was far to
their right. French communism is already assuming a French national
character. France unquestionably will go to the left, but that doesn't mean
France will adopt Russian communism or that it will necessarily be in the
orbit of Russian communism.
Britain-although Churchill will probably win the pending election,
with a smaller majority than he has had in Commons; that means maybe
another year of power for him-Britain unquestionably will go socialistic
within the next year or two, but that does not mean at all that Britain
will be communist in the sense that it will come into the Soviet Russian
sphere of influence.
But whether European countries go left or not, even if they should go
completely left and into the Russian orbit, it doesn't mean a great deal.
For the continent of Europe, which was for centuries the seat of world
power, is now the seat of no world power. It is a peninsula of Asia. The
centers of world power have moved and are moving to North America and
to Asia.
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Now for the second premise: that Russia isn't primarily interested in
Europe. It is her back yard, not her front yard. She is interested in making
herself secure in Europe against attack. But her interest in adding Spain or
France or the Low Countries or Scandinavia to the Russian sphere of influence is trivial beside her mounting interest in the eastern world. As
has often been remarked, Russia is essentially an Oriental country. Its mind
is morp Oriental than Occidental. The Russians are free from racial prejudice, and from any concept of their task in the world as the white man's
burden, they are superiorily equipped to meet and deal with and understand
the hundreds of millions of Asiatics. The population of Russia is growing
more rapidly today than the population of any other country in the world
except India. Russia's future contacts, its future markets, its future interests
lie increasingly landward to the east in China and India.
General Marshall and Admiral King have repeatedly asked the press
and public of the United States not to speculate on whether Russia is coming
into the war against Japan.
I think Russia will do so, and so do all the informed people I know.
But to all intents and purposes Russia is in the war against Japan. Surely
nobody thinks that the United States and Britain can dictate what is to be
the government of Korea or what is to be done with Manchuria if our
proposals in that respect are flatly disagreed to and opposed by the
Russians. The reason for the request of General Marshall and Admiral
King that we avoid speculation about whether or not Russia will come
into the war with Japan is simply this: if Russia can come into that war
in its own time, it can strike a telling blow against Japan. But if Japan
becomes convinced Russia is coming in Japan is likely to try to get in the
first blow as she did at Pearl Harbor. And if she were to do that, she
undoubtedly could take Vladivostok and some of the area around it and
it would cost the Russians time and men to regain what they had lost
before they could make their offensive participation in that war fully
effective. That certainly wouldn't be to our interest. But there is a further
and more important reason: if Russia believed that the American press
and public, by its speculation, had caused Japan to decide that Russia was
coming in and therefore that Japan must strike first, the Russians would
blame us for having prompted the Japanese attack. That would make our
relations with Russia more difficult, not simply in Europe, but in Asia
where Russia and the United States are going to have even more difficult
problems to work out than in Europe.
Russia apparently has promised to come into the Pacific war, probably
before the end of. the summer. Whether she will keep that promise, if she
has made it, remains to be seen. If she keeps it, of course it will be because
she thinks it is for her best interest, and not because of any sense of
gratitude or obligation to the United States. We see the United States
looking increasingly to the west. We are concerned as never before with
the internal government and policies of China. We are taking for granted
that we will permanently occupy island bases in the Pacific up to and
including Okinawa, and perhaps beyond. The population and industry on
our own Pacific coast has been permanently increased since Pearl Harbor.
All of these are straws in an unmistakable wind. Perhaps we underestimate

BENCH AND BAR
the significance and extent of our own turning to the west, because we
always have looked to the west. But we have only to recognize what we
are doing today to see that the same opportunities which beckon us
towards the Pacific beckon to Russia, too, and more strongly because
Russia is a part of Asia geographically and politically and even ethnologically. So I suggest to you that a broken Europe, three-fifths of which has
now come into the Russian orbit, is now a peninsula of Asia and has become the world's back yard and that Russia's real interest over the next
centuries lies to the east.
Now for my third and major suggestion, which is that the ability of
the United States and Russia to reach a working understanding is the
only hope of ourselves and of the world for peace in this century, and that
the chief burden of achieving such an understanding falls upon us if one is
to be reached which is to be at all satisfactory to us.
The United States and Russia will increasingly be the two great world
powers. All the newspaper men coming back from San Francisco point
out that decisions taken out there were taken by the whole assembly if
everybody agreed on it; but if there was disagreement, the decision was
made by the Big Five-the United States, Russia, Britain, China and
France; and if there was disagreement in the Big Five, the decision was
made by the Big Three; and if there was disagreement among the Big
Three, the United States and Russia decided; and if the United States and
Russia could not agree, there wasn't any agreement. If the United States
and Russia can agree upon and evolve a framework of collective security,
then no other nation or nations in the world can start a major war in our
time. I do not think it even matters, if we and Russia can agree and work
together, whether we have any long range policy for controlling Germany,
because Russia and the United States, as long as they agree, could improvise from month to month and almost from week to week a policy towards
Germany which would make it impossible for Germany ever to rise again
as an aggressor. But if the United States and Russia can't agree, then we
are virtually passing to Germany the balance of power. We are inviting
her to play Russia off against the United States and the United States off
against Russia, as Hitler so successfully played Russia against the west
in the 1930's, thus enabling Germany to raise itself by its bootstraps and
reconstitute itself and make another bid for world domination.
But I want to look even closer home for the inevitable consequences
of inability of the United States and Russia to work together. I am not
particularly afraid of war between this country and Russia in our time, or
perhaps in our children's time. Certainly at present and in the foreseeable
future such a war would be impossible for either nation to win in military
terms. That isn't, I think, the thing we need to fear. What we do need to
fear is an assumption on our part and on the part of the Russian people or
government that war between Russia and the United States is a future
likelihood, which has to be reckoned with as a possibility or a probability in
our formulation of national policy. The danger is that we will live under
the shadow of the fear of such a war, and that we will decide that we have
to gear our economy and our society to be ready for such a war. If we do
that, if we proceed from here on the assumption that we may have to fight
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Russia five or ten or fifteen or twenty or twenty-five years from now,
then we might just as well stop talking about reconversion; we might just
as well make up our minds that the conscription of our young men and the
regimentation and rationing of these last four years and the payment of
the kind of taxes we have been paying are just a practice swing for the
kind of lives we are going to have to lead from now on. And in that event
we may as well say goodbye to the kind of free society that we have thought
we were fighting to preserve. Because to prepare ourselves for such a
conflict means that we must be totalitarianized and militarized in this
country in such a way that we shan't again know what free government is.
The issue will never come before us in the form of any clearcut referendum
on whether or not we want harmony with Russia. The fabric of our future
will be woven thread by thread and determined by the steps we take on
individual and largely secondary issues, so that finally we will have to cut
our suit out of the cloth that we have woven.
Russia is even more suspicious of the United States than the United
States is of Russia, if that be possible. The American Army Graves Registration Service, when the Germans had been driven out of Rumania by the
Russians, sent a party of Americans in uniform into Rumania to identify
and mark and photograph the graves of several American flyers who had
been killed in the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields. The Russians, as soon
as they encountered this group of Americans, arrested them and said, "We
have uncovered a big American spy plot," because the Russians just
couldn't comprehend that the United States Army was attempting to
identify the graves of individual American dead. The Russians just don't
bury men that way who have died in war. They bury them in mass graves,
usually without identification, and it was incomprehensible to them that
the United States really was sending in a party of military men to try to
identify and mark individual American graves.
Here is another story: The Russians didn't want any American
planes piloted by Americans to land on Russian airports. They took delivery
of all our lend-lease planes, you know, outside of Russia. They did finally
agree, reluctantly, that any American planes which were so badly injured
bombing Berlin or eastern German targets that they couldn't possibly get
back to their own bases, might land, in such great emergency, at bases on
the Russian front. One day in the closing days of the war an American
Flying Fortress, which had been bombing Berlin, was hit by anti-aircraft
fire. The pilot thought he would have to come down at a Russian base.
So the plane was brought down. The Russian officer who came out to
greet them said, "What is your purpose in landing here? Your plane isn't
conceivably damaged badly enough so that there is any need for this. You
could have very easily got back to your base." The American pilot looked
over his plane and said, "Well, I guess it isn't as badly hurt as I thought. I
thought we were so badly injured there was some doubt as to whether we
could get back, so I landed here." The Russian said, "Well, this is all very
irregular, but since your plane has landed here you may as well go back a
couple of hundred miles, to a main base behind the lines, where your plane
can be repaired and refueled so you can go back to your western European
base." And the Fortress and crew took off for the rear base. They dis-
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covered that they had a stowaway, a Pole who had lived for some years in
the United States and spoke pretty good English. He said he was a Polish
patriot whom the Russians were seeking as a political prisoner, and that if
the Russians got their hands on him he would be sent to Siberia or shot.
He said, "I know this is a foolish thing I did. I hid in this plane in desperation, hoping you would save me." Of course, the Americans are suckers for
that kind of hard luck story, and there was probably a good deal of truth
in it. These lads are 26 or 27 years old, or younger, and it is their business
to fly and fight, not to know a great deal about political situations. But they
said to him that there wasn't anything they could do. When they landed at
the rear Russian base the Russians would go over the plane to repair it, and
he was bound to be discovered and there was nothing for him to do but
give himself up. Then a member of the crew had an idea. He said there was
an extra sergeant's jumper in the plane and the stowaway could be put into
that extra suit of coveralls and his name could be added to the crew and
maybe they could get him out alive. But when they landed at the rear base,
the officer said, "What is this, seven members of the crew. The manifest
telegraphed from the front said there were only six." It had never occurred
to the lads that the manifest would be telegraphed to the rear base. A little
questioning soon developed what had happened and the Pole was detected
and taken away, and the American members of the crew were held by the
Russians for a number of weeks, because the Russians were certain-and
probably still are-that they had uncovered a major spy plot.
The Russians see in anything which brings them into contact with the
Americans a possible plot of Americans to spy on them and to attempt to
obtain Russian secrets. Their suspicion, as I say, is just as great as our own
suspicion of the Russians.
We spent two hours and a half talking to General Eisenhower and
questioned him pretty closely about relations with the Russians. Eisenhower
said, "I personally have always gotten along splendidly with Stalin. Every
request I have made of him he has granted." But the very answer was
equivalent to saying that there was no military contact between the Russians and the Americans except at the very top level, between Eisenhower
and Stalin themselves. I quoted Eisenhower's remark to another American
general who laughed wryly and said, "Sure, but there are a lot of things
we would like to know about the Russians that are too trivial for Eisenhower to ask Stalin."
Amon Carter, Texas publisher in our party, had a son taken prisoner
by the Germans, who was in a camp in Russian territory. He hadn't bad any
word of his boy and was very eager to know *whether he was alive and
well. As soon as we got over there he started to work through military
channels to try to find out something. He didn't get anywhere. Finally the
request came clear up to Eisenhower and Eisenhower asked Stalin if he
could find out whether a boy named Carter was in the prison camp in
Luckewald. Stalin was fine about it. He not only looked up the boy, but
put him and half a dozen of his comrades on a plane and flew them back,
so that the boy was united with his father. The point of the story is that
the only way to accomplish that was for Eisenhower to ask Stalin.
De Gaulle came from a little town in eastern France. When the
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Germans came into that town in the invasion of France they took a
creamery and laundry and moved them over into eastern Germany. So when
the Russians and Americans had made a junction in Germany, De Gaulle
began asking for that creamery and laundry. Nobody could do anything
about it until finally it came to Eisenhower's attention. Eisenhower sent a
message to Stalin saying that De Gaulle's home town had a laundry and
creamery over in Germany and would he try and find them and send them
back. The point, again, is that Eisenhower had the only military contact
with Stalin. And when the fighting ended, questions that had been military
became political, so that military contacts, to all intents and purposes, ceased
to exist. And the only political contact between the United States and
Russia was the one that had existed between Roosevelt and Stalin. Some
Americans have thought this was a situation of Roosevelt's making-that
he insisted on handling personally our relations with the Russians. But I
think it was at least as much the fault of Russia and of its highly centralized government and of Stalin himself that there was no political contact
on the lower levels. When Mr. Roosevelt died, that political contact was
broken just at the period of intensification, with the end of the war coming,
when there was need for more and more contact. For weeks after the
death of President Roosevelt and during the time when the fighting was
ending we just hadn't any sure political contact with the Russians. It was
during that period that the diplomats were all saying that our relations
with Russia were deteriorating very rapidly. Harry Hopkins, I think, has
done a notable job of reestablishing the political contact, but there still is not
a regular, continuing political contact between the United States and
Russia, to enable the threshing out and exchange of opinions on differences between the two countries. For that reason some have suggested
that Eisenhower, who had a splendid record of dealing harmoniously with
the Russians on a military level, would be abler than any other man we
have to deal with the Russians on a civilian and political level. Eisenhower
represents what the Russians most admire in the United States-not just
military might but the productive and organizational might of the United
States which produced our military effectiveness. Possibly Eisenhower is
better equipped than any other man in the United States to negotiate and
deal with the Russians and to stand for principles and not give any
appearance of retreating on principles, while still being able to compromise
and negotiate and bargain and make concessions to the Russians.
After our conversation with Eisenhower, General Bedell Smith had a
luncheon for us and there were fifteen generals present. I was seated next
to Air Marshall Teddar, the British general on Eisenhower's staff whom
Eisenhower credits with having made tactical air power so effective an
arm of the army ground forces. 'Teddar, talking off the record about relations between Britain and the United States on the one hand and
Russia on the other, said, "Yes, perhaps Russia is going to behave even
more badly after this war than the United States did after the last one."
Well, that may be an irritating remark to some Americans, and yet it is
a very interesting British slant. Britain feels that the United States did
behave very badly after the first World War, and that a second World
War could have been avoided if we had behaved more wisely than we did.
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may be enough of a parallel there to be worth turning over in our
Is Russia's position for a generation after this war in international
going to be somewhat comparable to the isolationism of the United
in world affairs for a generation after the first World War?
One of the editors in our group asked an American general, "What
about Stalin's broken promises?" and he said, "Well, Stalin has a board
of directors the same as Roosevelt had or Truman has." The United States
broke some promises after the first World War. President Wilson made
some commitments which the United States didn't fulfill. Of course it can
be said that Wilson had no right to make commitments affecting the United
States until he knew that the Senate and the American people would back
them up. But apparently Stalin has made some commitments that the army
men and others around him would not back up, and therefore we say,
"Russia has broken some promises," in the same way the British a generation
ago, and with as much reason, said that the United States had broken some
promises.
It took the United States 25 years and the awful curse of a second
World War to realize the responsibility that we have to take in world
affairs, if we are to have security for ourselves. It seems probable that it
is going to take 25 or 50 years to bring Russia around to a belief that it
can work in mutual good faith with its western neighbors in world affairs
in the kind of organization that has been set up tentatively at San Francisco.
But the United States has got to take the initiative in wooing Russian
friendship and breaking down the misunderstandings which exist between
ui, because the Russians, better than we, can afford to play a waiting game.
The events of history will tend to play into Russia's hands if we just let
things drift in the world, because the longer we go without taking affirmative action, the more powerful, comparatively, Russia will be and the less
powerful will be the nations like Britain and France, whom we have
traditionally regarded as friends.
I am not suggesting that we sacrifice principles. On the contrary, I am
pleading that we retain our principles and promulgate them and live up to
them so that they will be understood and respected by Russia and by the
great part of the world which is still inchoate, but which is going to have
to be reckoned with increasingly in the generations ahead.
It is utter nonsense that opposition elements in the United States
congress at this moment should be trying to cut down the appropriation of
OWL Maybe the OWI hasn't been efficiently run and maybe it needs a
thorough housecleaning. But the most effective means we have of advertising our system to the world can be through the OWL. And certainly the
Republicans have an interest in advertising the American way of life to
the world and acquainting the people of the world with what we believe
to be its advantages. It seems to me folly on our part to object so intensely,
on the one hand, that the Russian system have an unimpeded chance to
spread over the whole world, and at the same time to refuse to advertise
to the world the things that we believe in and the fruits of our belief.
I am urging not that we abandon principles, but that, standing on those
principles and living up to them, we be willing to negotiate and compromise and make concessions on details, and that we conduct an aggressive
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campaign of friendship with Russia, which may win, over a long period
of time, the confidence of the Russian people. In order to do that we have
got to recognize the difference between principles and details.
I was talking to Commander Stassen on the telephone some days ago
in San Francisco, and he said, "Is it true, as we feel out here, that there is
a wave of anti-Russian opinion sweeping the United States because of the
feeling that too many concessions have been made out here to the Russians?"
I said, "I think there is a rising wave of suspicion against Russia, although
I don't know how much of it arises from what has been happening in San
Francisco." And he said, "We have not surrendered any principles to the
Russians. All that we have given them is time." We must not surrender
principles; we must be ready to give endlessly on details and to compromise
and negotiate and bargain. To work out a harmonious relationship with
Russia is going to take, on our part, a great deal of humility and consummate patience and tact, and I am not sure that those are characteristics of the
American people. A lot of Americans are going to be saying all of the time,
"We have already made too many concessions to the Russians. Why don't
we stand up for our rights and not give an inch. Let's stop kowtowing to
them." There are people who are going to holler that we are surrendering
our principles in every dealing that we attempt with the Russians, because
these people want, not agreement, but disagreement.
I think all of us tend to recognize our own sacrifices more readily
than we recognize the sacrifices of other people. In almost every audience
that I talk to, when I say anything about Russia, somebody comes up to me
and says, "Well, the trouble with the Russian people is that they haven't
been allowed to know how much the United States has done for them. We
have given them planes and tanks and guns." The Russians would reply to
that, "Yes, we know how much you have done for us, but do the Americans
realize how much Russia has done for them?" Russia gave 10,000,000
Russian lives to defeat Hitler in Europe. And I am one of those who
believes that Hitler wouldn't have been defeated in Europe this year or
next year, and maybe not at all, if we hadn't had Russia on our side. If
our dead had equalled Russia's, in proportion to our population, the United
States'would today have seven and a half million dead in the fighting in
Europe instead of fewer than a hundred thousand. Planes and tanks and guns
don't weigh much in the scale against human lives. But a good many
Americans would reply, "The Russians didn't give those lives for us. They
gave them to save their own skins." And the Russians would say, "That
is the kind of realism we would like more of in dealing with the Americans.
Of course we gave the lives to save our own skins! Of course the Americans gave the planes and tanks and guns to save their skins! And the sooner
the United States recognizes that both nations did what they did because
each was trying to save its own skin, and not for any sentimental reasons,
the sooner we will be on a realistic basis in foreign affairs."
The American people need to understand why the Russians regard the
end of fighting in Europe as the end of a chapter and why they have turned
to a completely clean page in the relationships between the two nations. They
regard events from here on as a beginning over again. The Russians, I
think, would give us credit for having been a pretty fair wartime ally, and

BENCH AND BAR
the Americans would regard the Russians as having been pretty fair wartime
allies. But the Russians say, "That is all over now. The war is past. Now
We want to know what kind of a peacetime ally you are going to be." Relations between the United States and Russia will inevitably grow better
from now on, if we have patience and tact. They are already growing
better. But the road is long. The die is not going to be cast in Europe alone,
or by what Russia does or does not do in the Pacific. This is a long term
proposition, a matter of 25 or 50 years, and we must keep on working
year by year to try to find a basis of compatibility with Russia in a framework of collective security large enough so that within it the Russians
can continue to be Russians and the people of the United States can continue
to be Americans. To work together is not impossible. The alternative to
working together is so catastrophic that even if we couldn't see the slightest
ray of hope for avoiding ultimate conflict with the Russians, it would still
be five or ten or fifteen or twenty years too soon to say that conflict was
inevitable.
If we, as Americans, have the genius and the patience to fashion from
the military victory of the United Nations in Europe the beginnings of a
system of collective security-if we have the courage and 4mbition and the
belief in our own society to work aggressively to bring Russia to an understanding of our point of view-then we can get to a place 25 or 50 years
from now from which we can look back and say we won in Europe. It is
too early yet to say that we have. The military men have been able only,
as always, to clear the ground on which we can build the kind of structure
that we are going to live in. The kind of structure that we build is up to
us to make.
Thank you.

